Ø Rising Sun And Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan Í Download by Ø Richard Connaughton

Ø Rising Sun And Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan Í Download by Ø Richard Connaughton There are not a great number of modern histories of the 1904 1905 Russo Japanese War, but Richard Connaughton s Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear is clearly the best The author, with 30 year s experience in the British Army and access to British official records on the war, brings a richer and detailed military account than Denis and Peggy Warner s The Tide at Sunrise which is also very good, but less detailed While the author leans toward admiration of the Japanese war effort at one point, describing the Japanese army as a well oiled machine with high morale, confident, well practiced and undefeated he is than fair to the Russian side as well This book is marked by superb detail, superior organization and insight derived from sound military judgment and experience Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear consists of 15 chapters, with a conventional chronological structure based upon major topics The author also provides 15 sketch maps, which are a bit skimpy but adequate Connaughton provides a succinct but excellent background chapter on events leading up to the war, followed by an even better chapter on opposing forces In addition to excellent detail on both ground and naval forces, the author cites the main Russian weakness as an over abundance of elderly, ineffective leaders In the sections on early ground and naval actions, the author notes that a British correspondent reported the attack on Port Arthur as it was occurring a first in journalism Throughout the book, the author makes the point and supports it with evidence that Japanese operations were facilitated by a superb intelligence effort, while Russian efforts were hindered by awful intelligence support Despite the fact that the Russians usually had numerical superiority on the ground and at sea, they continually thought they were out numbered Although many historians have been very harsh on the Russian war effort, Connaughton notes that Russian strategic plans were usually sound, but poorly executed On the ground, the Russians were also hindered by commanders who adhered to outdated tactics, such as volley firing and attacks in mass formations across open ground The Russians did enjoy some advantages, such as a superior logistic capability based upon the China Eastern Railway and new quick firing artillery pieces Russian infantry units were also quite good at building defensive positions integrating machineguns and barbed wire, intimating conditions that would soon appear in the First World War The author also notes that the Japanese were unsuccessful in following up after their victories, with pursuits being hindered by inadequate cavalry and weaker logistics I also noted from this account, that the Japanese made the mistake of using landmarks such as rail lines as boundary markers between their formations which usually leads to no one really controlling the rail line The sections on the siege of Port Arthur are particularly interesting since they allude to the slaughter that modern weapons could inflict on infantry The author is equally harsh on General Nogi s wasteful attacks which Allied generals would repeat in 1914 16 and the self defeating behavior of General Stoessel Interesting details include the Russian use of naval torpedoes on land and the Japanese mistake in making their assault ladders too short Russian heroes, such as Smirnov, Tretyakov and Kondratenko do get their due in these pages, as well Amazingly, the author notes that the Japanese prepared the surrender document two years before the war began talk about prior planning Japanese success in blasting the Russian defenders off the vital 203 Meter Hill with heavy artillery may have convinced European military observers that firepower could break any defense In a few cases the author overstretches himself At one point, he states that an approach march at night culminating in a dawn attack was a new phenomenon of warfare Didn t Washington teach the British that lesson at Trenton and Princeton in 1776 At another point, he notes the appearance for the first time in modern warfare of the construction of opposing lines of trenches which ignores the appearance of trench warfare at Petersburg in 1864 However, these omissions are not that for a British military historian, since they rarely acknowledge or utilize examples from American military history In a few cases, the author may have used facts that were unconfirmed, such as Japanese heavy artillery consumption at Port Arthur the figures sound unreasonably high and the infamous Samsonov Rennenkampf brawl which probably didn t happen The author asks two key questions why were the Japanese able to consistently defeat the Russians and why were the lessons of this war not understood before World War One As for the first, the author believes that the Japanese had a distinct advantage fighter closer to home, which led to higher morale The Japanese military also benefited from a leadership structure based on merit and ability, rather than political connections As for the second, the author notes that different observers took home different lessons from the war and often drew diverging conclusions, often in line with their own prior biases.
Connaughton s book is a good ,comprehensive history of Russo Japanese war Both were expansionist powers.
So confrontation seemed inevitable Budding Japanese nationalism collided head on with Russian imperialism Creeping Russian expansion into Korea posed a threat Japanese national interests Tokyo reacted violently.
On February 6,1904 Admiral Togo launched a pre emptive strike on Russian fleet that lay at anchor at Port Arthur Though Togo failed in destroying the fleet , he succeded in crippling its movements Japanese landed troops on the west coast of Korean peninsula and soon effected a crossing of river Yalu This marked the beginning of demise of Russian power in the Far East.
Here I wish to make a few comments which a student of War History may find it enriching Russian withdrawl from Yalu together with its failure to fall back upon Liaotung peninsula unbarred the road to Port Arthur which came to be besieged by Japanese forces Subsequent Russian attempts to relieve the siege were foiled However the striking feature of these campaigns were Japanese inability to gain decisive victory Japanese armies often managed to pierce or outflank Russian positions but failed in enveloping it Russians refused pitched battles and effected tactical retreats into the depths of Manchuria.
Author has argued Russo Japanese war as harbinger of First World War machineguns, barbed wire entanglements, artillery, Japanese use of arsenic smoke during the siege of Port Arthur I endorse this view Coming of machineguns bestowed lethal firepower on defending forces making massed frontal assaults suicidal and costly This led to emergence of no man s land which gradually widened separating combatants making decision increasingly difficult Japanese came to depend on artillery overwhelmingly to suppress enemy fire zones which at that time were not too deep It sound ironical experience derived from this war was not incorporated into the training manuals of Western armies As a result, European had to re learn this experience painfully during Great War Equally significant was the importance of troop morale in war.
Japanese morale was superb Japanese soldier never shrank from courting death He knew only one thing ,advance,Advance despite all obstacles strewn across the path Victory at all costs The above combined with a fanatical respect for authority personified in the form of Emperor transformed Japanese soldier into formidable fighting machine.
Regrettably , this was a war ignored by historians and academics though this cause a tectonic shift in forces which drastically re arranged world affairs What were they It stimulated revolutionary tendencies in Russia which for a long time was gnawing at its vitals.
By removing Russian threat it helped Kaiser s Germany to focus efforts in the West.
This altered balance of power in Europe In order to restore equilibrium Britain ended her policy of isolation and entered into an alliance with France.
But biggest impact of Japanese victory was felt in Asia, Africa It infused confidence and boosted the morale of peoples who were struggling to free themselves from European tyranny In India ,the effect was profound During wintry nights people sat in circles and spoke about Japanese victories while passing huqqa.
Finally, it sowed the seed of future confrontation with US Covert American support emboldened Russians turn down Japanese demand for war reparations Tokyo now started viewing Washington with suspicion, hostility and distrust.
Author was unable to attach sufficient importance to the above aspects Be as it may,the book is an essential reading for history buffs and layman alike.


There aren t NO footnotes to this Cassell edition of this important book It is indeed sad and very unprofessional that an otherwise very good book of this level of narrative detail would omit its reference sources Additionally, the narrative detail is degraded by the poor quality of maps provided The maps in this book are of such extremely poor quality, they provide barely enough detail to orient yourself to the flow of combat As a result you cannot adequately envision a lot of of important details regarding the conduct of operations If you can locate some independent maps, the narrative detail is much meaningful Most people are highly ignorant regarding the importance of this war in regards to the military operations througout the 20th Century Both of these significant inadequacies no sources and poor maps in this edition only exacerbate our lack of knowledge regarding this important war.
A very good look at the Russo Japanese war The Russian ground forces had many chances to win but poor training with even worse leadership threw them away The Russians were good at defense but it was a case of almost won This war in fact started the downfall of the military that fell in world war one They were not ready for the next war This war started Japans case of victory fever that ended in world war two A good book on a little known subject.
The Russians Were Wrong Footed From The Start, Fighting In Manchuria At The End Of A , Mile Single Track Railway The Japanese Were A Week Or So From Their Bases The Russian Command Structure Was Hopelessly Confused, Their Generals Old And Incompetent, The Tsar Cautious And Uncertain The Russian Naval Defeat At Tsushima Was As Farcical As It Was Complete The Japanese Had Defeated A Big European Power, And The Lessons For The West Were There For All To See, Had They Cared To Do So From This Curious War, So Unsafely Ignored For The Most Part By The Military Minds Of The Day, Richard Connaughton Has Woven A Fascinating Narrative To Appeal To Readers At All Levels